Introduction
On 5 October 2015 in Atlanta, Georgia, 12 Pacific Rim countries announced that they had reached an agreement in principle on a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The agreement, signed at a formal ceremony held in Auckland, New Zealand, in early February 2016, now awaits formal ratification by each country. 1 Although the ratification process may prove difficult, in the words of two US-based trade lawyers, ''Most agree that the TPP is a case of a trade agreement that is too big and too important to fail'' (Matthiesen and Hamill 2016, 10) . 2 The TPP is claimed to be the largest regional trade agreement in history and ''one of the most important trade agreements ever for the global automotive industry'' (US Congress, 2016) . The 12 member countries-Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam-which together constitute a market of 800 million consumers and account for nearly 40 percent of world gross domestic product, are major consumers of automotive products. They are also major producers of automotive products, covering 30 percent of global auto production (Conference Board of Canada 2015, 4) , and include 4 of the world's top 10 automobile producers: the United States, Japan, Mexico, and Canada. Several other Asian countries, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea, have signalled their interest in joining the TPP, and it is widely anticipated that China, currently the world's largest producer of automobiles, may also eventually seek membership.
From the very beginnings of the auto industry in the early 1900s, trade policy and trade agreements, especially in relationship to the United States, have played a significant role in shaping its presence in Canada (Anastakis 2005 (Anastakis , 2013 Holmes 2004) . Similarly, several recent trade agreements, including the Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement (CKFTA), the Canada and European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, and the TPP, will all likely influence the future of the industry. 3 Our objective in this article is to provide an overview of the automotive provisions contained within the TPP and an assessment of how these provisions may affect the Canadian automotive industry. For context, we begin with a brief description of the current structure of Canada's automotive industry and existing patterns of automotive trade. We then identify the various automotive provisions within the TPP agreement, discuss the principal ways in which they may affect Canadian automotive production, and identify which segments of the Canadian industry are most likely at risk of disruption. Perforce, this analysis must be conjectural and provisional in nature because the agreement likely will not come into force until at least 2018.
If ratified, the agreement will represent a pivotal moment for the automotive industry. It will likely have a significant impact on future firm strategies with ensuing implications for what, where, and how automotive products will be produced within the wider TPP region (Matthiesen and Hamill 2016, 10) . It is not surprising, therefore, that in the weeks leading up to the final agreement, questions concerning the impact of the TPP on Canadian automotive production and employment became the focus of considerable media and public interest. Because Canada was in the midst of a long federal election campaign, and the full text of the TPP agreement was not yet publicly available, arguments and counterarguments swirled around the potential impacts of the TPP on the automotive industry (DesRosiers 2015; Head and Mayer 2015; Keenan 2015; Moffat 2016; Mordue 2015; Stanford 2015; Unifor 2015) . Commentators provide estimates that range all the way from a loss of more than 24,000 automotive jobs (Stanford 2015) to a significant increase in vehicle production and employment in Canada (Head and Mayer 2015) . 4 Industry stakeholders are similarly divided in their reaction to the agreement and their assessment of how it may influence the long-term viability of automotive production in Canada. The CVMA, which represents the Detroit-3 (D-3) automakers-Fiat-Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors-in Canada, expressed concerns over what it viewed as unequal terms in the deal, particularly citing Canada's pledge to reduce tariffs more quickly than some other key TPP member countries, including, specifically, the United States (CVMA 2015) . Ford Canada's chief executive officer, Dianne Craig, publicly denounced the deal, stating that ''there will be no positive outcome for Canadian manufacturing'' (Posadzki 2016) . In contrast, the Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association of Canada endorsed the deal as a significant victory for Canadian-based automotive producers and consumers (Worts 2015) .
The membership of the Canadian APMA appeared split: Two of the three largest Canadian-owned parts manufacturers publicly spoke out in support of the TPP (Panetta 2015) , whereas many smaller Canadian parts makers voiced concerns regarding its potential negative impact on their business (Keenan 2015) . The latter perceived the lower automotive RCV requirements in the TPP, as compared with NAFTA, as opening a back door to low-wage third countries such as China, Indonesia, and Thailand and posing a significant challenge for Canadian firms producing metal stampings, wheels, and parts for clutches and engines (Matthiesen and Hamill 2016) . In testimony before the House of Commons Committee on International Trade, the APMA (2016) bluntly stated that automotive parts manufacturers were not consulted in the final lead-up to the agreement. The APMA argued that, in its current form, the TPP ''fails the auto supply sector, specifically the prospects of its small and medium sized members and the Canadian-based production growth capacity of its larger members-it [the government] must approach ratification with caution.'' Unifor, the union representing autoworkers in Canada, projected that the TPP could result in a loss of more than 20,000 jobs in the Canadian automotive industry (Unifor 2015) . 5 The union argued that lower tariffs on assembled vehicles will result in an influx of vehicles from Japan into North America, displacing content value formerly produced by Canadian-based assemblers and parts producers. Furthermore, very low RCV requirements for some parts will facilitate increased offshore sourcing and radically disrupt existing North American supply chains (Stanford 2015) .
Assessing the impacts of the TPP on the automotive industry in Canada is complicated by the fact that, under NAFTA, the production and marketing of vehicles is highly integrated across the North American continent. Thus, any assessment of the impact of the TPP must take into account not only the direct impact on Canadian automotive production but also the indirect impact caused by TPP-triggered changes in levels of automotive production in the United States. Furthermore, Canada already has significant levels of automotive trade with three of its TPP partners-the United States, Mexico, and Japan-and growing levels of automotive imports from two potential future TPP members, South Korea and China (Holmes 2015) . 6 Two studies published in 2012 use quantitative modelling to assess the impact of free-trade agreements (FTAs) on North American automobile production and employment. Assessing the potential impact of three possible FTAs-between Canada and Korea, Canada and the European Union (EU), and Canada and Japan-on auto industry production and employment in Canada, Van Biesebroeck, Gao, and Verboven (2012, 2) find only modest impact on domestic production for different possible trade liberalization scenarios. . . . The highest effect we ever find for Canadian trade policy is in the case of full unilateral elimination of tariffs for vehicles from all three trading partners-Korea, Japan, and the E.U.-and assuming a restrictive demand system. Even in this scenario, total loss of local production is estimated to be at most 14,407 vehicles, or 0.70% of total domestic production. Using the average jobs-per-vehicle ratio for the entire Canadian automotive market, this translates into 660 jobs.
Furthermore, a US-Korea FTA would have a larger negative impact on vehicle production in Canada than a CKFTA because of the much higher level of Canadianproduced vehicle sales in the United States as compared with domestic Canadian sales.
In anticipation of Japan's inclusion in the TPP, McAlinden and Chen (2012, 1) estimate that, under a US-Japan FTA, Japanese vehicle exports would likely increase by 105,000 units or $2.2 billion (an increase of 6.2 percent) due to the elimination of a 2.5 percent tariff. U.S vehicle production is estimated to fall by 65,100 units which CAR estimates would result in a loss of 2,600 direct U.S. automotive manufacturing jobs. 7 Thus, both studies conclude that a modest negative impact on domestic automotive employment would result from the displacement of domestically produced vehicles by increased imports. Both focus solely on the impact of the removal of the tariffs on vehicles and do not consider the impact that might arise as a result of changes in rules of origin and RCV; these issues are of crucial significance in the case of the TPP.
Structure and Performance of Canada's Automotive Industry
Automobile production involves a highly complex and sophisticated manufacturing process. The end producta motor vehicle assembled by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-is built from literally thousands of discrete parts and subassemblies supplied by a vast array of different firms organized into complex supply chains and production networks. Companies in automotive supply chains are commonly referred to as Tier 1, Tier 2, or lower tier suppliers; these terms refer to the commercial distance between the OEM automaker and supplier.
Parts suppliers located in Canada consist of (1) foreignowned, and especially US and Japanese, global parts producers; (2) a handful of Canadian-owned parts producers such as Magna International, Linamar, and Martinrea that have a global footprint; and (3) a large number of Canadian-owned small-and medium-sized Tier 2 and Tier 3 firms that primarily feed assembly plants and higher tier component producers in both Canada and the United States. In 2015, the supplier sector accounted for just over 70,000 jobs, or roughly two-thirds of all Canadian automotive manufacturing employment (Statistics Canada 2016) .
Geographically, all 10 Canadian vehicle assembly plants and more than 90 percent of parts plants are concentrated in a narrow corridor in southern Ontario stretching from Windsor in the west to Oshawa in the east. This corridor is the cross-border extension of, and functionally integrated with, the traditional regional automotive production cluster centred on the US Great Lakes states (Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin). Today, this regionally integrated production system competes for new investment within North America with major automotive clusters that have emerged in recent decades in the southern United States and in Mexico (Rutherford and Holmes 2014) . Thus, the fortunes of the Canadian automotive industry are inexorably linked to the overall competitive performance of the Great Lakes regional automotive cluster.
The Auto Pact, the influential managed FTA negotiated with the United States in 1965, facilitated the rationalization of Canadian automotive production and its full integration with the United States. Although the Auto Pact permitted tariff-free trade in automotive products between the two countries (for qualifying companies), value-added content requirements guaranteed specified minimum levels of production in Canada. The industry flourished in Canada under the Auto Pact, and by the early 1980s, Canada accounted for more than 14 percent of North American vehicle production, with more than 80 percent of Canadian-built vehicles exported to the United States. Continuing access to the US market was secured by the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (1989) and by NAFTA (1994) , which also led to full integration of Mexico into the North American industry.
After several decades of sustained growth in output and employment, Canada's automotive industry faltered in the early 2000s. By 2008, annual vehicle output was a third lower than the peak of 3.06 million attained in 1999, and employment in the combined assembly and 
Canada's Current Pattern of Automotive Trade
Until the TPP comes into force, Canada's automotive trade continues to be governed by existing rules regarding levels of NAFTA RCV required for duty-free movement of automotive products among Canada, Mexico, and the United States and by existing tariffs on automotive trade with other countries. The NAFTA RCV requirement is set at 62.5 percent for cars, light vehicles, and engines and transmissions and at 60 percent for automotive parts.
Under NAFTA, vehicles built in the United States and Mexico that fail to meet the NAFTA RCV and vehicles built outside the NAFTA bloc incur a non-preferential tariff of 6.1 percent when imported into Canada. 8 Since the late 1990s, automotive parts destined for OEM assembly in Canada have entered tariff free, whereas aftermarket parts incur a tariff of 6.0 percent. Given the crucial importance of the US market for automotive exports from Canada, the corresponding non-preferential tariffs levied by the United States are 2.5 percent for cars, 25 percent for pickup trucks, and 3.1 percent for OEM parts.
The United States continues to be the dominant factor shaping aggregate flows of vehicles into and out of Canada (for a detailed analysis, see Holmes 2015) . In 2015, the United States accounted for 81.1 percent of Canada's total motor vehicle trade by value, 97.7 percent of vehicle exports, and 60.1 percent of vehicle imports (Table 1) . Canadian vehicle exports to countries other than the United States are extremely small; even Mexico, Canada's other NAFTA partner, accounts for less than 1 percent. Canada still enjoys a vehicle trade surplus because of the sheer volume of cars exported to the United States, but this surplus has shrunk with the growth of vehicle imports from Mexico and the EU.
In 2015, 92.0 percent of Canadian automotive parts exports by value went to the United States (Table 2) , overwhelmingly destined for assembly plants in the Great Lakes states. Besides the 4.4 percent exported to Mexico, Canada exports very few auto parts to countries other than the United States. Over the past 10 years, the proportion of automotive parts imported into Canada from the United States dropped while imports from Mexico, China, the EU, and South Korea grew (Table 2) .
In summary, Canada is extremely reliant on the US market for more than 90 percent of its vehicle and automotive parts exports. Surprisingly few vehicles or even parts are exported to Mexico, and exports of both vehicles and parts to all other countries, including Japan, are virtually non-existent. Canada's current automotive trade, in both absolute and relative terms, with TPP countries other than the United States, Mexico, and Japan is minuscule (Table 2) . However, Canadian imports of automotive parts from two aspiring future TPP membersChina and South Korea-have risen sharply in recent years (Holmes 2015) . Potential Impact of the Trans-Pacific Partnership on Automotive Production in Canada
For the global automotive industry, with its highly integrated and dynamic supply chains, the TPP is a highly complex agreement. The roughly 600 pages that address the automotive industry include sections on tariff removal, ''rules of origin'' specifying the minimum levels of TPP RCV required for automotive products to qualify for preferential tariff treatment, and several critically important bilateral automotive side agreements between the United States and Japan, Canada and Japan, and the United States and Malaysia. The rules of origin are undoubtedly the most critical in terms of potential impact on automotive production and jobs in Canada. For a vehicle or a component to qualify for preferential tariff treatment, it must ''originate'' in the TPP region; to originate, it must contain a specified minimum level of RCV or be sufficiently processed within the region. Rules of origin are a highly technical and arcane aspect of trade law, and the rules of origin for automotive products contained in the TPP agreements are indeed complex.
Tariff Elimination: Vehicle Exports TPP supporters, including the Canadian and US governments, emphasize that, by phasing out tariffs, the agreement will provide North American-based vehicle and parts manufacturers with improved access to TPP markets, thereby generating opportunities for export growth. This is a somewhat misleading argument (ITAC 2015, 5) . Japan has had zero or very low tariffs on imported North American automotive products since 1988. The challenges faced by the D-3 in selling vehicles in Japan are due not to tariffs but to an array of non-tariff rules and regulations, differing consumer tastes, and demographic factors. In reality, only two TPP countries with commercially significant markets-Malaysia and Vietnam-still have high import tariffs on automotive products. 9 Although significant, the elimination of these tariffs occurs over a relatively long period. The remaining TPP countries have small domestic markets. Thus, the growth of North American automotive exports solely as a result of tariff reductions is likely to be modest at best.
Other Measures to Increase Market Access for Exports
The most crucial automotive market access issue addressed in the TPP concerns Japan, the second largest TPP economy and the third largest automotive market in the world. A US Congress (2016, 4) report notes that Japan has long been the most closed auto market among industrialized nations, with imports from all countries constituting just six percent of the Japanese market. Although Japan currently imposes no tariffs on imports, it has effectively shut out foreign imports through a range of non-tariff barriers that include unique, Japanspecific safety and environmental regulations, high autorelated taxes, zoning laws and other obstacles to establishing dealerships, service and repair center [sic] for foreign cars.
Before Japan joined the TPP negotiations, the United States and Japan reached a series of agreements addressing non-tariff issues. Designed to improve D-3 vehicle access to Japan's automotive market, these agreements are contained in an appendix (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2015, TPP Agreement, Chapter 2, Annex 2-D, Appendix D) and in automotive-related side letters attached to the agreement. The United States insisted on the long phase-out period for tariffs on vehicles imported to the United States to allow time for Japan to demonstrate that it will abide by its market access commitments. The side agreements establish an accelerated dispute settlement procedure for the automotive sector, including a mechanism to ''snap back'' tariffs on both vehicles and parts as a remedy in the event of a surge of imports from Japan. Key US auto industry stakeholders, however, remain skeptical that these commitments will result in a larger D-3 presence in the Japanese vehicle market (ITAC 2015).
Tariff Elimination: Vehicle Imports from Japan into the NAFTA Bloc
Any increase in vehicle imports from Japan has the potential to squeeze D-3 North American market share, displace vehicles assembled in North America by Japanese automakers, or both. This would result in a reduction in vehicle production in the United States and Canada with attendant negative consequences for North American parts supply chains. How likely is this to happen? Currently, Canada levies a 6.1 percent tariff on vehicles imported from Japan, and the United States places a 2.5 percent tariff on cars and a 25 percent tariff on trucks.
The import into Canada of vehicles built in Japan has actually declined over the past decade (Table 1) as Japanese automakers have expanded the production of mass-market vehicles within the NAFTA bloc. 10 TPP tariff elimination schedules vary between member states (Table 3 ). Canada has one of the shortest transition periods, with tariffs scheduled to be phased out over five years. For the United States, not only is the phase-out on Japanese imports much longer-30 years for the tariff on pickup trucks and 25 years for carsbut the phase-outs are also back-loaded. Thus, although any significant impact on US vehicle production of tariff elimination on imports from Japan is unlikely for at least two decades, there may be a much earlier negative impact on Canadian domestic vehicle production. Some safeguard for domestic production is provided by a separate side agreement with Japan in which Canada reserves the right to reinstitute tariffs for up to 12 years after the phase-out period should there be a vehicle import surge from Japan (Boscariol et al. 2015) . 11 The significant difference between Canada and the United States in the phase-out period for tariffs on vehicles imported from Japan could conceivably have an adverse affect on new vehicle assembly investments by Japanese automakers in Canada. In the case of the United States, an incentive persists for up to 30 years in the case of pickup trucks for Japanese automakers to build vehicles in North America for the US market rather than import them from Japan. In contrast, any tariff-related incentive to build vehicles in Canada rather than import them from Japan disappears within 5 years. 
Tariff Elimination: Automotive Parts Exports
Under NAFTA, Canadian-based suppliers exporting to the US enjoy duty-free preferential access as compared with the 3.1 percent tariff levied on US imports of non-NAFTA parts. Canadian parts exports are heavily weighted toward the United States ( Table 2) . As soon as the TPP comes into force, the tariffs on 87 percent of auto parts, including engines, brakes, and transmissions entering the United States, will be eliminated. This will expose parts producers in Canada to increased competition for the US market from TPP suppliers outside of NAFTA. The removal of US tariffs on parts imported, for example, from Japan will also remove the current advantage that Canadian-based assembly operations enjoy due to the zero tariff on parts imported for assembly in Canada. As we show next, Canadian suppliers will likely come under further competitive pressure owing to the TPP's complex RCV rules.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Rules of Origin and Regional Content-Value Requirements
Under the TPP, a single set of RCV rules applies to all TPP member states. For assembled vehicles, 45 percent of their net cost must originate from within the TPP for the vehicle or part to receive preferential tariff treatment, a full 17.5 points lower than the 62.5 percent RCV required for vehicles under NAFTA. Automotive parts fall into three groups requiring, respectively, 45 percent, 40 percent, or 35 percent RCV (Table 4) . Several potential consequences flow from these rules of origin, but it is important to remember that the rules of origin only matter if the exporter is claiming a tariff preference under the TPP.
Impact on Vehicle Imports from Japan into Canada
Once the current 6.1 percent tariff is phased out in five years, a vehicle built in Japan (or in any other TPP country Note: HS ¼ harmonized system; NES ¼ not elsewhere specified; TPP ¼ Trans-Pacific Partnership.
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currently subject to the non-preferential tariff on vehicles) will enter Canada duty free as long as it contains at least 45 percent TPP content. The remaining 55 percent could come from non-TPP lower wage countries such as China, Thailand, and Indonesia, thus reducing the production cost of the vehicle and, in conjunction with the elimination of the tariff, making imported Japanese-built vehicles more price competitive in the Canadian market. 12 Imported vehicles could displace domestically produced vehicles and have an attendant negative impact on both domestic assemblers and component suppliers. Japanese automakers have well-developed supplier networks that extend into Vietnam, Indonesia, and, especially, Thailand and China for parts to be assembled into vehicles built in Japan (Kasuga et al. 2005; Natsuda, Otsuka, and Thoburn 2015; Tanruangvechjaroon 2013) . These networks were developed at the time when Japanese automakers came under pressure to lower production costs because of the appreciating value of the yen. Both China and Thailand supply a broad range of OEM parts for assembly in Japan, whereas parts sourced from Vietnam are concentrated in specific categories (Table 5) .
Impact on Vehicle Production and Trade within the NAFTA Bloc
Under NAFTA, vehicles currently built in North America must contain at least 62.5 percent RCV originating from the United States, Canada, or Mexico to qualify for dutyfree movement between the three countries. The TPP will permit duty-free movement for vehicles with as little as 45 percent RCV from within the TPP region. There is no limit on how much of the 45 percent can originate from TPP countries such as Japan, Vietnam, or Malaysia. The remaining 55 percent can come from non-TPP countries anywhere in the world, including low-cost countries such as China, Indonesia, Thailand, or India.
At first glance, there appears to be a difference of 17.5 points (i.e., 62.5 minus 45.0) between the RCV required for vehicles under the TPP as compared with NAFTA. The actual difference, however, may be more or less than this because of the different RCV calculation methods used in the two agreements. Estimating the effective difference is very complicated and ultimately indeterminate (see US Congress 2016). Researchers with Japan, but applicable to all parties, permit the required TPP RCV for vehicles to be even lower than 45 percent. 13 The appendix contains a list of parts, including safety glass, bodies, body stampings, bumpers, and drive axles, and a list of operations that includes complex assembly, machining, stamping, and laminating. If, in a TPP country, one of the operations is performed on one of the listed parts, the part is deemed as ''originating'' there and its value counts as originating content for the purposes of calculating the RCV for the finished vehicle.
The TPP will enable automakers who, for example, build vehicles in Canada for export to the United States to substitute parts currently produced and sourced from within the NAFTA region with an increased number of parts sourced from low-cost third countries, such as China, Indonesia, or Thailand, and still qualify for preferential tariff treatment of the vehicles. This would have an obvious negative impact on production and employment in the Canadian automotive parts industry in Canada.
Rules of Origin and Regional Content-Value Requirements for Automotive Parts
For automotive parts to enjoy preferential tariff treatment under the TPP, the RCV on parts ranges from 35 percent to 45 percent using the net cost method (Table 4) . As with finished vehicles, however, the special appendix (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2015) provides the flexibility to use non-originating materials in the manufacture of a part and have those materials count as originating. The parts listed in the appendix include engines, chassis, bumpers, brakes, drive axles, steering wheels, and suspension systems. As long as one of the operations noted earlier, including complex assembly, is applied to the non-originating material being incorporated into a part in a TPP country, the material, subject to a cap, qualifies as originating (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2015, Chapter 3, Annex 3-D, Appendix 1). The cap on how much the non-originating materials can contribute to the RCV is set at either 5 percent or 10 percent depending on the specific part. Even a 5 percent difference in what can count as regional content could make an enormous difference to the price competitiveness of a component. This rule will force firms to think very carefully about where and how to produce particular parts.
To illustrate the significance of this flexibility in calculating RCV, the US Congress (2016, 14) report uses the example of vehicle engines. The TPP appendix allows engines that are subject to complex assembly in a TPP country to contain as much as 10 percent non-originating material (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2015). Thus, the actual required RCV of the engine effectively drops from 45 percent to 35 percent with as much as 65 percent of the engine parts coming from outside the TPP region, while still allowing the engine to meet the 45 percent RCV requirement. Furthermore, the engine itself will be considered as originating in the TPP region, and its full value will count toward the 45 percent RCV for the finished vehicle into which the engine is built. A similar analysis can be applied to other major vehicle components such as suspension, steering, and brake systems.
The flexibility provided by the rules in the appendix will likely have a negative effect on parts producers further upstream in the supply chain for any major component (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2015). In part, this explains why Canadian automotive parts suppliers were divided in their support for the TPP. Large Canadian-owned parts producers with established global footprints will benefit from the flexibility of being able to source less expensive parts from outside the TPP region-parts that, in the case of their North American-focused production, they must currently source from within North America to satisfy the NAFTA RCV. As we have seen, an engine producer, for example, will have the flexibility to source up to 65 percent of the value of discrete engine parts from outside the TPP region and still meet the 45 percent TPP RCV for the assembled engine. Under NAFTA, they are restricted by the higher RCV (62.5 percent) and by tracing list restrictions that prevent non-originating engine parts from becoming originating. 14 However, lower tier Canadian producers of discrete engine parts, and, in turn, their material suppliers, will likely suffer from the engine producers' newfound flexibility under TPP to source parts from outside the NAFTA region. In general, the further back along the supply chain the parts supplier is from the vehicle assembler, the greater the risk that the supplier will lose any preferential advantage currently enjoyed under NAFTA.
Some commentators argue that tariffs and rules of origin do not necessarily drive sourcing decisions and that the TPP's lower RCV rules will not have a dramatic effect on North American automotive production. For example, Mordue (2015) argues that existing NAFTA content requirements have had minimal effect on sourcing decisions. As evidence, he points to the fact that vehicles currently made in Canada are well above the 62.5 percent RCV threshold demanded by NAFTA even S38 Carey and Holmes though Canadian assemblers have been able to import components from anywhere in the world duty free for at least the past 15 years. So why, he asks, will the TPP be any different? Mordue (2015) also suggests that ''long supply chains and six-week lead times-what you tend to get from far-flung locations-are not consistent with lean manufacturing, build-to-order and just-in-time manufacturing.'' His argument has merit with regard to certain classes of parts. Colour-in-sequence parts such as seats and fascias are usually manufactured in close proximity to the assembly plant, as are vehicle bodies, because of their bulk and susceptibility to damage in transit. 15 The sourcing of complex and highly engineered components over great distances may lead to significant delays and costs if the supply chain is disrupted or the part is subject to a recall. 16 In summary, Canadian producers whose components are relatively complex, who do not currently face significant competition from China, and for whom proximity matters more than cost may remain largely unaffected by the change in rules of origin and RCV. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, the impact will be negative on those Canadian parts producers whose components are less complex, who face competition from China or other low-cost producers, or for whom cost is more important than proximity.
Conclusion
Our analysis of the potential impact of the TPP on the Canadian automotive industry reveals a complex picture. Given the integrated and interdependent nature of automotive production across the North American continent, and especially between Canada and the United States, one must be mindful not only of the direct impact on Canadian production of vehicles and parts but also the indirect effect caused by changes to production levels in the United States. Our analysis suggests that e TPP RCV requirements are likely to have a much greater impact than the removal of tariffs as such; e Growth in Canadian vehicle exports to markets outside North America is likely to be limited at best; e Increased Canadian import penetration by vehicles built in Japan is possible because of their increased price competitiveness resulting from the removal of the 6.1 percent tariff and the inclusion of parts from low-cost countries both within and outside the TPP, which could have a negative impact on domestic vehicle production; e The very great difference between the United States and Canada in tariff phase-out periods on imported vehicles from Japan could favour Japanese automakers locating new assembly investment and reinvestment in the United States rather than Canada;
e The weaker rules of origin for both vehicles and parts are expected to be harmful for Canadian and US production of auto parts, particularly parts produced by lower tier suppliers; e There will be new growth opportunities, but outside of Canada, for Canadian-based global parts makers; and e Small-and medium-sized Canadian parts makers will face increased competitive pressure from parts produced in low-cost countries and suppliers furthest from the assembler in the supply chain and producing discrete parts for components such as engines and suspension and brake systems will be most vulnerable.
Although there will be undoubtedly winners and losers, it appears from our analysis that the automotive provisions in the TPP, if implemented, will on balance have negative consequences for automotive production and employment in Canada.
Notes
1 If the agreement has not been ratified by all partner countries before 4 February 2018, it will enter into force after ratification by at least six states that represent a combined gross domestic product of more than 85 percent of the gross domestic product of all signatories. 2 The TPP agreement runs to 30 chapters and 6,000 pages of text, is broad in scope, and is much more than a simple trade deal. Among the most contentious elements in the agreement are the provisions around intellectual property, investor state dispute settlement, and the weak provisions regarding constraints on countries manipulating currency exchange rates to gain competitive advantage. At the time of this writing (August 2016) and as the US presidential election campaign unfolds, ratification of the TPP by the United States is becoming less certain. 
